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RICHARD DAVIES PARKER*
This is an appeal to my generation. Specifically, this is an appeal to
people in the "generation of the 1960s" who are now doing constitutional law.
We are, as a group, in a better position today than we have been before or
probably shall be again to think about how we want to do constitutional law.
On one hand, still relatively new to the teaching or practice of the law, we can
think about it free, for now, of self-imposed orthodoxy. On the other hand, by
now more or less established, we are in a position to think for ourselves, free
of orthodoxy imposed by others-if only we will.
My appeal is this: Our elders have brought constitutional theory to a
crossroads. Out of their experience of life in our polity, they have conceived
the problems of its constitution in their own way. As a generation, we have
had a rather different experience of life in our polity. Therefore, it is given to
us to conceive the problems of its constitution in a new way.
The books by Jesse Choper and John Ely' provide an occasion for my
appeal. Both authors work with a constitutional theory-a "process-
oriented" theory-that Las dominated the field for a long time. Both work
inside that theory, revising it in similar ways and, I believe, perfecting it. In so
doing, they take us to the crossroads at which we confront our present choice.
We may continue along the line that they have followed. Or we may turn in a
new direction. Their books indicate, in my view, that further elaboration of
their lines of speculation can only lead us into a fog. The reason is not that
they speculate too much about the quality of the political process and too little
about substantive values.2 Nor is it that their speculations are blindered by a
focus on what the Court has already done.3 Nor is it that, hampered by a
conventional theory, they cannot say anything new. Both of them innovate-
indeed, Ely does so brilliantly. Rather, the reason is that, in doing it, they
bring to the surface deeply rooted assumptions of conventional "process-
oriented" theory that seem, or ought to seem, starkly implausible in light of
the experience of our generation.
My essay is brief and yet it indulges in fairly sharp and general evalua-
tions of types of theory, "conventional" and "new," and of generations of
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3. See Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and tie American Way: An Interpretation of Public Last Scholarship in tile
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theorists, "past" and "future." In that respect, it is an example of a sort of
writing that now is starting to burgeon in our field.5 This sort of writing is
bound to irritate many readers. It blurs distinctions that are important to those
whose views-to say nothing of those whose generations-are being typed.
Beyond that, no one much likes to be pigeonholed as "'conventional" or a
vestige of "the past." Thus we hear complaints (intended to turn the tables)
that such writing smacks of the rudeness, pretentiousness, and quest after
novelty-the stubborn refusal to accept established wisdom-that (suppos-
edly) is characteristic of our generation. To that charge I would make a plea of
partial confession and avoidance. True, writing of this sort tends to slight
nuances that absorb those who work inside a long-standing tradition of
thought. It is a genre for outsiders. True, it tends to be confrontational. It is a
polemical genre. True, it tends to call for some "new" perspective that, for
the time being, it can only sketch from a "new" generation not yet committed
to any such perspective. It is a hortatory genre. But these, I believe, are
virtues. This sort of writing about the study of law has appeared before. It was
common, for example, in the formative days of legal realism. 6 Then, as now,
its aim was to distance-and so to liberate-us from conventions of thought
about the law. Its appearance, now as then, marks a moment of opportunity,
an opportunity for an intellectual advance that has first to be fired, shocked
into life, by a renewed critical consciousness of assumptions that are taken for
granted inside an established wisdom.
I. THE PAST OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A VIEW FROM INSIDE
To appreciate the deep implausibility of the constitutional theory within
which Choper and Ely work, we ought first to look at it from inside. That is,
we ought to start with a sense of its aims, contours, and internal tensions.
Therefore, I shall begin by sketching conventional theory. Then, I shall note
some significant respects in which each of the two authors elaborate, extend,
and revise the theory. And then, I shall sketch the sort of critiques to which
each of them is vulnerable from inside the theory.
A. Background
The outlines of contemporary "process-oriented" theory may be simply
drawn by locating it in relation to two polar pictures of our constitutional
order that have appeared from time to time, in more or less diluted form, since
5. Most of the "burgeoning" so far has been in articles by one person, however. See Tushnet. Darkness on
the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980);
Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies,
57 TEXAS L. REV. 1307 (1979). For an earlier example of this genre, see Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly
Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
6. E.g., Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
7. Cf. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 259-66 (I.
Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970).
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1787.8 The constitution of our polity-the essence of its "good order"-may
be depicted, first of all, as inhering in the constitutional document or in a
system of abstract doctrine of constitutional law. In that case, constitutional
order is seen as transcending--disembodied from-the clash of wills and
movement of passions that characterize day-to-day political life. It may then
be enforced on political life to discipline those wills and passions. Its en-
forcement is necessarily a process totally divorced from politics--detached,
objective, a matter of abstract legal "'reason."
At the other extreme, our constitutional order may be depicted as inher-
ing not in a document or doctrine, but in our day-to-day politics. In that case,
it is seen not as transcending the political process, but as embodied in it. The
political process, in turn, is seen not as threatening, but as operating sponta-
neously in "good order." We can count on our political system, once set up,
to work well enough. Hence constitutional order need not be enforced on
politics. It need hardly be enforced at all.
Through the nineteenth century, diluted but recognizable versions of the
two pictures of constitutional order appeared in Supreme Court opinions.
Two general strategies seemed to emerge to reconcile them. First, there was
an analytic strategy. This involved the analysis of constitutional issues into
types. Some issues were seen in the context of one picture of constitutional
order, and other issues were seen in the context of the opposite picture of
constitutional order. This strategy appeared in two forms. In one form, the
argument was made that some issues are "political questions," for the most
part problems of expediency, and are best suited to resolution through the
political process, while other issues involve principles calling for disembodied
enforcement. 9 In another form, the argument was made that the representa-
tive political process generally can be counted on to protect interests impli-
cated by doctrinal issues of one type-for instance, issues of national power-
but that interests implicated by other doctrinal issues-for example, issues of
individual rights-are much more likely to be threatened by that process and
thus must find protection through the enforcement of disembodied order.'
Second, there was a synthetic strategy. This also took two forms. One
form of the synthetic strategy started with the reliance on the document and
doctrine fundamental to disembodied order and then qualified it by recogniz-
ing that their meaning is fluid. Thus, the argument was made that the import of
8. The clash in the 1780s between two political ideologies related to my two "pictures" of constitutional
order is described in G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 46-124, 162-96, 259-305,
344-89, 430-67, 593-615 (1969). In an as yet unpublished essay-entitled "Political Vision in Constitutional
Argument"-l develop the notion of"pictures of constitutional order" and of"embodied" and "disembodied"
constitutional order. I use the terminology here simply for purposes of(eventual) consistency; I do not elaborate
on it here.
9. E.g., Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 166, 170 (1803).
10. Compare, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-02, 431, 435-36 (1819), i'ith
Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163, 166, 170 (1803). In the 1870s, the Court seemed to believe that
"states' rights" were more threatened by the political process than certain "individual" rights. Compare, e.g.,
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-78, 82 (1873), with Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
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particular restraints on power may safely adapt-as the political process
adapts-to changing times." The other form of the synthetic strategy began
with the reliance on spontaneous operation of the political process essential to
embodied order and then qualified that process by taking note of its dangers.
Thus, the argument was made that in general the political process works well
enough, safeguarding all interests, but that it is subject to occasional malfunc-
tion, and hence that the mission of constitutional law is to enforce standards
geared to correct such malfunctioning.
2
By the turn of the century, both strategies appeared to be heading toward
exhaustion. A majority of the Court tended to view all sorts of issues in a
context of strictly disembodied order. 13 In response, dissenting Justices and
commentators tended to view all sorts of issues in a context of embodied
order.' 4 Thus, they depicted the political process as basically "rational- and
insisted that limitations be imposed on it only in assumedly extremely rare
cases of clearly "irrational" mistake. 5 What is more, they not only debunked
the idea that the political process is threatening, they also debunked the idea
that a document or a doctrine has a fixed, determinate meaning and can be
enforced with detachment or objectivity free of room for judicial discretion. '6
An enforcement decision, they concluded, is a political decision; and political
decisions are properly and safely enough consigned to the political process.
So, constitutional theory, for a time, seemed polarized, at an impasse. Con-
temporary "process-oriented" theory emerged in or around the 1930S' 7 to
resolve that impasse, to reinvigorate and elaborate old strategies of reconcilia-
tion.
The theory was developed for the most part by academics who had the
time and motivation to reach new levels of sophistication in working out the
old strategies of reconciliation. In the main, their enterprise was a reaction to
the terms of the impasse that plagued constitutional theory in the early dec-
ades of the century. First, they sympathized with the belief that the processes
of our representative democracy are basically in "good order," that they
generally can be counted on to operate spontaneously to serve all interests.
But, second, they sympathized with the belief that on frequent occasions
those processes may threaten certain interests worthy of protection. In par-
II. E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07, 415-16 (1819).
12. E.g., id. at 423 (discussion of "pretext").
13. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The "Lochnerera,' as is now recognized, was hardly
uniform, although, I suspect, there is a risk that in emphasizing the inevitable variety of majority opinions in the
.. era" we may lose sight of theirgeneral character. As should be clear by now, however, I am making absolutely
no pretense here of writing an intellectual history of the constitutional thought of two centuries. My purpose is
simply to sketch a general background for "'process-oriented" theory. I trust that my assertions about that
background are not especially controversial. But their truth must depend on a detailed study that I have no
intention of undertaking here.
14. E.g., id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. E.g., id. The seminal academic statement ofthis view at the time was Thayer. The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
16. E.g., id.; Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
17. As everyone knows, the seminal statement was United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938). See Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1 (1942). See also Braden.
The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 579-82 (1948).
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ticular, they perceived the constant danger that "majorities" might oppress
"minorities" and ride over fundamental "rights of individuals." They also
were worried that, in the fast-changing times, the people's protections and the
people's representatives might fail to respond to changing needs and wants.
Yet, third, they accepted the view that the enforcement of constitutional
limitations cannot possibly be perfectly objective, free of discretion, or de-
tached from politics. That led them to become almost obsessed with the
"anomaly" of judicial review-an institution necessary to correct the mal-
functions of, yet "deviant" in, our representative democracy.' Animated by
these concerns, they moved constitutional theory forward on three fronts at
once.
First, they employed synthetic and analytic strategies to cope with the
"anomaly" of judicial review. Recognizing that judicial enforcement of con-
stitutional order inevitably involves a degree of discretionary political deci-
sionmaking, they claimed that judicial discretion is nevertheless tempered by
a degree of objectivity and detachment from politics. To substantiate this
synthetic claim, they made much-though somewhat vaguely-of the learning
and habits of reflection (supposedly) typical among judges, their tenured
insulation from the pressures and passions of day-to-day political life, and
thus their special capacity for reasoned elaboration of fundamental constitu-
tional principles.' 9 Furthermore, they argued that judicial discretion may be
limited (though not eliminated) by boundaries established in the text or else-
where on the fluid content of constitutional principles and by the constraining
methodologies of proper judicial reasoning. 20 At the same time, they made the
more analytic claim that certain types of issues (having to do, for example,
with "civil rights") lend themselves especially well to judicial resolution ac-
cording to principle, while other types of issues (having to do, perhaps, with
"economic" matters or national power) are too bound up with questions of
fact and policy, too "discretionary," and so should be left alone by the
courts. 2' By the same token, they analyzed constitutional principles into vari-
ous types, the application of some involving less substantial and so less
"anomalous" judicial intervention than others.2 - Finally, they claimed that
judicial review is also less "anomalous" in a representative democracy if
judges act only on "process" issues having to do with perfection of repre-
sentative democracy itself, avoiding interference in the political resolution of
more controversial "substantive" matters.23
18. E.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962).
19. E.g., Hart, The Tue Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959); Griswold, Of Time and
Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81 (1960). But see Arnold, Professor Hart's
Theology. 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960) (stating the truth of the matter).
20. E.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959)
(methodology); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962) (textual boundaries).
21. See, e.g., the review and discussion of this argument in McClosky, Economic Due Process and the
Supremte Court: An Erhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34.
22. E.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 200-34 (1962).
23. E.g., Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evoling Doctrine on a Changing Court-A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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On both of the other fronts, the academic elaborators of contemporary
theory coped directly with the problem of how to reconcile the two polar
pictures of constitutional order, though their solutions always referred back to
cope with the problem of judicial review as well. On one front, they resusci-
tated the old forms of the analytic strategy. First, Herbert Wechsler revived
and elaborated the old argument that some types of issues-his focus was on
questions of national power vis-a-vis the states-can safely be left for resolu-
tion in the political process while others cannot.24 He argued that, in Con-
gress, states' interests are well represented and thus spontaneously safe-
guarded. Second, Alexander Bickel adopted the other form of the analytic
strategy. He, too, divided issues into types, but not doctrinal types. He
claimed that on issues of "expedience" the political process can function well
enough, while on issues of "principle" it may not.2
On the other front of contemporary theory, the theorists elaborated old
forms of the synthetic strategy of reconciliation. First, they focused on the
interpretation of the document and on the content of doctrine and argued that
the meanings of both may adapt-as the political process adapts-to changing
concerns. Thus, they depicted important provisions of the document as
"open textured, ' 2 6 left "to gather meaning from experience," 27 setting out
broad "concepts" within which each generation may articulate its own "con-
ception" of constitutional guarantees. Similarly, they depicted elements of
doctrine like "balancing tests" as a synthesizing limitation of the political
process with adjustment to its terms.2 9 Second, the theorists also focused on
the workings of the political process, depicting them as basically sound, but
assigning to constitutional law a mission of correcting specific malfunctions in
the process. On one hand, they concentrated on the process by which an
"evolving consensus" in society controls government decisionmaking; they
contended that the law should be shaped to clear occasional blockages in the
way of that process and to undo its occasional distortion by vindicating "con-
sensual" values flouted by government. 0 On the other hand, they focused on
the process by which representation of competing interests in the political
"marketplace" safeguards the interests of all; and they argued that the law
should be shaped, once again, to remove blockages frustrating the process
and to remedy its distortion by striking down governmental actions that seem
to have resulted from some sort of "market failure."'
24. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
25. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 65-72, 111-98 (1962).
26. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 31-43 (1975).
27. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing).
28. Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Mr. Nixon, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 4, 1972, at 27.
29. E.g., Mendelson, On the Meaning ofthe First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV.
821 (1962.)
30. E.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 143-272 (1962).
31. E.g., L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975).
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These elaborations of the synthetic strategy consumed the most intense
energies devoted to contemporary theory. Yet they also produced the most
persistent quarrels among theorists. The quarrels were spawned both by the
customary dependence of the strategy on vague, intuitive (and so contro-
versial) assessments of the political and judicial process and by the lack of a
systematic structuring of the strategy that was needed to sift and coordinate
its various forms and claims. Theorists kept returning to worry over their
peculiar obsession: judicial review. If both document and doctrine are fluid
enough in meaning to adapt to fast-changing times, what real limitation is
there on judicial discretion? If the Court vindicates values embraced by an
"evolving consensus," isn't it taking upon itself a quintessentially political
role? And if the Court steps in to protect losers in the political process, won't
it become no more than another actor in the marketplace of interest-group
politics? The wearying persistence of these all-too-familiar controversies sug-
gested that the strategy of reconciliation might be about to break down once
more.
This, roughly, was the situation of contemporary "process-oriented"
constitutional theory when the new books by Choper and Ely were published.
B. Peifection
The publication of these two books is important because, I think, they
perfect "process-oriented" theory. By that I do not mean that they leave
nothing more to be said within such theory. Nor do I mean that they are (even
close to) flawless. Rather, I mean that the two books, taken together, develop
the theory to a level-whip it into a shape-that, at last, allows us to see what
it truly involves, what sorts of things it has to say to us.
First, each of the books sets out to correct a shortcoming that before had
frustrated development and clouded understanding of "process-oriented"
theory. On one hand, Choper aims to build a more precise and empirical basis
for the typical claims of the theory. Previously, the theory's dependence on
vague conclusory intuitions about the functioning of the political process
tended to germinate fruitless internal quarrels and to smother critical assess-
ment under a blanket of pieties. So, Choper sets about to assemble and
explore a mass of historical examples and political science research to ground
his accounts of the political process. Ely, on the other hand, aims to provide
the systematic structure, sifting and coordinating claims, that until now has
been missing. Without such a structure, internal quarrels tended to go on in a
rather haphazard fashion with most lines of argument dead-ending in the old
conundrum of judicial review. Thus, Ely specifies and systematically elabo-
rates a normative theory of a representative political process that (he pro-
poses) will sufficiently constrain judicial discretion and, simultaneously,
identify the occasional malfunctioning of our own political process which it is
the main office of constitutional law to remedy. Ely does not ground his
descriptions of our present political process in data. Nor does Choper elabo-
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rate a comprehensive theoretical structure. Between them, though, they bring
"process-orientation" to methodological maturity.
The second respect in which the two authors perfect the theory involves
their elaboration of familiar "process-oriented" claims. Choper employs an
analytic strategy. He contends that in general our political process operates
effectively to ensure the responsiveness of government to the electorate. "
Then, he examines the functioning and malfunctioning of the process with
regard to three types of doctrinal issues. On matters of "individual rights," he
claims, the process is likely to malfunction. For in America a "high degree of
mutual empathy does not exist."' Hence, majorities are apt to "disregard"
the interests of minorities, and judicial review is necessary to enforce "'princi-
ples" safeguarding their rights.33 Next, he claims that on issues of national
power vis-4-vis the states and separation of powers between the executive and
legislative branches, the process works very well. The interests implicated by
such issues, he asserts, are represented by powerful actors in the process who
have both the incentive and the capacity effectively to safeguard them. He
concludes that judicial review consequently is unnecessary there, saving the
judiciary from immersion in the discretionary assessments of "'policy- that
(he claims) are essential to those issues.34 Large portions of his argument have
been made before. 35 But the detail with which he elaborates it and his exten-
sion of it to encompass separation of powers issues appears to milk the ana-
lytic strategy for about all it is worth.
Ely employs a synthetic strategy. First, he considers interpretation of the
constitutional document. He demonstrates that certain "open-ended" provi-
sions not only allow, but invite fluid adjustment to changing circumstances.
He argues, however, that their interpretation ought to be structured by a
normative theory of a representative political process. Then, he goes on to
evaluate our political process in light of his theory. Like Choper, he claims
that the process normally functions to ensure government responsiveness to
the electorate. But he focuses on two of its tendencies to malfunction. He
contends, on one hand, that those in power have an incentive, in service of
their self-interest, to impair access (through "voice and vote") of others to
the process and, hence, to impair government responsiveness.36 And, on the
other hand, he argues that even if no one is barred from access, majorities-
motivated by prejudice-are likely to disregard or undervalue the interests of
certain minorities.37 That, in turn, violates the duty of "equal concern and
respect" for all interests that Ely claims is the core of representative govern-
ment. He advocates judicial review to correct both sorts of malfunction.
32. CHOPER, supra note I. at 29-45.
33. Id. at 65.
34. Id. at 171-379.
35. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role oftthe States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
36. ELY, supra note I, at 104-34.
37. Id. at 135-79.
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Although many elements of Ely's elaboration of the synthetic strategy are
quite familiar, many-particularly his emphasis on motivation-are not.:
With its rich texture and myriad doctrinal implications, his elaboration devel-
ops the strategy to a pinnacle of sophistication and coherence.
Finally, despite differences in methodology and strategy, Choper and Ely
conspire to perfect "process-oriented" theory in a third respect. It has to do
with the basic conception of the functioning and malfunctioning of the politi-
cal process that is the foundation of the theory. Both of the authors conceive
the process in the terms of interest competition and representation. They see
it as a "market" in which particular interests compete, building shifting ma-
jority coalitions from issue to issue. And they evaluate its functioning and
malfunctioning by determining whether the process is adequately responsive
to those interests. In so doing, they reject a conception embraced by certain
other "process-oriented" theorists-most prominently, Alexander Bickel-
that concentrates not on the responsiveness of government to competing
interests, but on its responsiveness to an evolving popular consensus. By
opting decisively for an interest-focused conception, and rejecting a con-
sensus-focused conception, Choper and Ely accomplish important improve-
ments in the theory.
First of all, they cleanse the theory of the obscurantism introduced by the
consensus-focused conception. As Ely contends, there rarely is such a thing
as a popular consensus and, even if there were, its contours could not be
identified with confidence.39 By comparison, an assessment of the respon-
siveness of government to particular interests is relatively realistic and
determinate.
Second, their interest-focused conception is more conducive to a rigor-
ously "process-oriented" enforcement of constitutional principles than a
consensus-focused conception.40 To reverse a decision on the ground that it
flouts values on which there is a consensus-a remedy which Bickel endorses
in certain instances4 '-is, as Ely argues, to impose "substantive" values on
the political process, and is therefore inconsistent with the aspirations of strict
"process-orientation. 42 But to reverse a decision on the ground that it re-
stricts the access of some interests to the process or that, motivated by
prejudice, it did not take certain interests into fair account is, Ely insists, only
38. There has, of course, been a great deal of discussion of the problem of "motivation" in the last several
years. But Ely really started it all a decade ago. Compare Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970), with A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 208-21
(1962). And Ely, unlike other recent writers, puts his discussion of motivation in the context of a general theory.
39. ELY, supra note I. at 63-69.
40. A problem which recurs in "'process-oriented'" theory involves the proper remedies for a malfunction
in the political process; once it is concluded that the process malfunctioned in producing some decision, it is
clearly proper to remedy the cause of the malfunction, but is it appropriate to strike down the decision as well?
For discussions of the problem, see Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Sandalow,
Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977).
41. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 235-43 (1%2). But see A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY
OF CONSENT (1975).
42. ELY, supra note I. at 63-69.
1981]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
to perfect the working of the process, not to impose "substantive" values on
it. 43 Even if Ely is not right about that, even if his approach cannot really live
up to rigorous "process-oriented" pretensions, 44 the interest-focused con-
ception is at least less patently subversive of such pretensions than the con-
sensus-focused conception.
Third, in Choper's and Ely's hands, the interest-focused conception gen-
erates an account of political malfunctioning and thus of active judicial review
that is more systematic than any generated by the consensus-focused concep-
tion. Proceeding from the latter conception, neither Bickel nor any of his
successors has elaborated a general explanation of when and why government
fails to respond to a broad consensus. Rather, their account of political mal-
functioning-and of the appropriate occasions for active judicial review-has
been relatively ad hoc. 45 By contrast, Choper and Ely perceive political mal-
functioning when access barriers or prejudice against minorities undercut the
responsiveness of government decisionmaking to relevant interests. The mal-
functioning they identify is systemic, not ad hoc. Thus, they can account
for-not simply carp about-the phenomenon of active judicial review. Not
only do they sharpen the theory, they also make it (in the old, much maligned
sense) "relevant."
C. Internal Critique
The perfection of "process-oriented" theory does not spell an end to
disputes over questions of conventional constitutional theory. But, probably,
it does portend an end to "constructive" controversy about them. It seems to
me likely that conventional theorists will now devote their main energies to
the destruction of the strategies of reconciliation only just perfected through
"process-orientation." For the constitutional theory of the past contains, I
believe, a dynamic that makes the strategies of reconciliation alluring and yet
at the same time impossible to sustain, however perfect.46
What makes them alluring is the tension between the polar pictures of
constitutional order that appears to have structured and animated our con-
stitutional theory for a long time. Tension begs for some sort of reconciliation.
What makes reconciliation impossible to sustain is that the ingredients re-
quired for it to work-through either an analytic or a synthetic strategy-are
incompatible. The first vital ingredient is a theory of politics, at once prescrip-
tive and descriptive, that specifies respects in which our political process
functions well and respects in which it does not. Such a theory seeks to
mediate between the fear of a dangerous politics central to the picture of
disembodied order and the faith in a safely benign politics central to the
43. Id. at 75 n)'.
44. See text accompanying notes 51-54 infra.
45. E.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 147 (1962).
46. I am, of course, turning against Ely his own rhetoric about the -'allure- and "'impossibility" of
"interpretivism.'" See ELY, supra note 1, at 1-41.
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picture of embodied order. The second ingredient vital for any workable
reconciliation is that this theory of politics must itself be uncontroversial as a
political matter. For if it is controversial, if it is implicated in the politics that it
purports to describe and evaluate, it will not mediate successfully between the
polar pictures of constitutional order. From one pole, it will be condemned as
a threatening imposition of a partisan viewpoint; from the other, it will be
criticized for short-circuiting the benign processes of politics. And from both
poles, it will be rejected as a wholly inappropriate basis for decisionmaking by
non-elected officials exercising the power of judicial review. Yet the fact is
that any prescriptive-descriptive theory of this sort will be politically contro-
versial. To be sure, its controversial nature may be covered up for a while.
But, eventually, critics working from the premises of conventional theory will
expose it.
No doubt, Choper and Ely did not conceive their enterprise in quite this
way. Nevertheless, they appear to have understood the problem. For not only
do they contrive in terms of interest competition a "process-oriented" theory
of political life, they also struggle to establish it on an objective basis as "cor-
rect," uncontroversial. It is exactly that aspect of their books which, I be-
lieve, will inspire the most devastating internal criticisms. By sketching the
sort of internal critique to which both authors are vulnerable, I want to suggest
the probable futility, even on its own terms, of pursuing conventional theory
much further.
Choper seeks to establish his theory of the functioning and malfunction-
ing of our political process on an objective basis of empirical fact. Repeatedly,
he insists that he is engaging in a "pragmatic assessment" or a "realistic
analysis" of our politics, not just airy, value-laden theorizing.47 He marshals
historical examples and political science research at nearly every point in his
argument. No one can accuse him of skimping. Many pages of his book
amount to long string citations of barely digested data. He makes no claim to
completeness. Yet the standard by which he selected his tedious gobs of data
is not revealed. The result is hardly compelling. Such criticisms should raise
doubts about his effort to ground his theory on an uncontroversial foundation.
More significantly, though, the "pragmatic," "realistic" lessons that Choper
himself is able to draw from his data are remarkably hedged and vague. Again
and again, assessing his data, he notes factors cutting various ways and in-
adequacies in ready evidence, admits that the questions are ones of degree to
which "no wholly confident answer can be made," then concludes nonethe-
less that "there is support in reason and experience to believe" one thing or
the other.43 One must applaud his intellectual honesty. But one must also
recognize that his noble methodological experiment in empiricism has not,
finally, enabled him to escape dependence on the sort of controversial evalu-
47. E.g., CHOPER, supra note I, at 64, 214, 215.
48. Id. at 234.
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ations that has always plagued "process-oriented" theory. And, even if a
marshalling of data could be made to yield more clear-cut assessments of
differences in qualities of interest representation in the political process, it still
could not claim to establish the theory on an objective, uncontroversial basis.
This, in the end, is the decisive point: the very idea that the political process
"functions" (that is to say, functions in "good order") whenever every rele-
vant interest (how do we know which are "relevant"?) is adequately repre-
sented (what ought that to mean?) in governmental decisionmaking-and that
it "malfunctions" otherwise-is itself a potentially very controversial propo-
sition. No quantity of data will make it any less so.
Ely recognizes this point. He tries to solve the problem. Repeatedly, he
condemns alternative approaches to constitutional law by claiming that they
rest on seriously controversial values and that their contours are significantly
indeterminate. 49 Thus he sets for himself a mission of transcending these
shortcomings. He surpasses Choper by seeking an uncontroversial foundation
not for factual assumptions involved in his theory, but for its very root propo-
sition: that our political process functions well when all relevant interests are
adequately represented in governmental decisionmaking. He attempts to
establish the proposition on the basis of an objectively "correct" constitu-
tional interpretation." Hence, he claims that the Framers must have intended
"open-ended" clauses of the document to grow in meaning, but insists that
the growth be bounded by some determinate principle. That principle, he
claims, is provided by "a coherent political theory" mandated by the
Framers. It defines, he insists, "the American system of representative gov-
ernment. -5' And, once elaborated, it mandates fairly determinate answers to
constitutional issues-with room only for a few "judgment calls.",52 Ely's
approach is very clean and neat. But it can be blown apart from inside with
remarkable ease. Indeed, internal criticism beginning to blow it apart has
already begun to appear. First, the application of Ely's theory of representa-
tive government can be shown to depend on obviously controversial value
judgments-not just close "judgment calls." 53 Second, his definition and
49. ELY, supra note I, at 43-72.
50. Granted, Ely says that it is only on his "'more expansive days" that he is "'tempted to claim" that his
approach "represents the ultimate interpretivism." Id. at 87-88. He must then have drafted the crucial pages
dealing with his theory of representative government only on those days, because his tone in presenting the
theory is consistently one of announcing a plain truth. Id. at 77-88.
51. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). Choper also uses the notion that there is one established normative political
theory as a premise for his argument at certain points. See CHOPER, supra note I, at 64, 79. It is an easy-but, I
would have thought, an utterly incredible-way of trying to camouflage, or insulate from criticism, the values on
which an argument is based. It would take an absurdly simplistic (or biased) view of social life and intellectual
history to believe that any one set of values has ever really been so completely established as to be the American
set of values. Surely, social life and intellectual history are somewhat more complex and confused than that.
And, certainly, this is the case when the set of values in question is a "coherent political theory" built of
concepts that are "essentially contested." See Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts in M. BLACK, THE
IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 121-46 (1962).
52. ELY, supra note I, at 103.
53. See Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in
the Seventies, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 1307 (1979). See also Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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elaboration of the theory involves a concealed imposition of controversial
values as well. It cannot be written off as the mandate of the Framers. Ely
lambastes the idea that there is such a thing as a consensus on values today,
but he blandly asserts that there was a consensus on "a coherent political
theory" among the Framers. He relies, for example, on a book by Gordon
Wood to support his assertion. But he seems to have ignored the central
theme of the book: that at the time the original Constitution was framed there
was an absolutely radical disagreement on political theory.54 Perhaps there is
more of a consensus today; perhaps more people today believe in the "co-
herent political theory" Ely advocates; perhaps his book is an exercise in
contemporary consensus theory after all. But, if that is the case, Ely himself
has already blown it apart in his condemnation of contemporary consensus
theory. Ely's theory, then, appears to me to be Ely's theory-no more and no
less. As such, it is very interesting. But by Ely's own standard that is not
enough.
Failing to establish a theory of the political process on a firmly objective
basis, "process-oriented" theorists can still fall back, of course, to a more
qualified claim. They can claim that although prescriptive-descriptive theories
of the political process are themselves bound to be politically controversial
and thus to involve the controversial imposition of "process values," they are
not as controversial as theories of "substantive value" and their enforcement
is therefore less problematic. This claim is an old chestnut within conven-
tional theory. Because Choper and Ely thought it insufficient, they sought to
do better-and did not succeed. Whether or not it will suffice to defend the
strategies of reconciliation in future debates within conventional theory re-
mains to be seen. My guess is that it will not. My guess is that-with
"process-oriented" theorists having perfected their position and having tried
and failed to ground it on a firmer foundation-the strategies of reconciliation
will break down and conventional theory will polarize once again.
These internal quarrels can-and undoubtedly will-go on at great
length. It is always fair and generally valuable to evaluate a theory by its own
aims, to try to pop its pretensions. It is also the path of caution. But, after a
while, we ought to ask: what is the point? Once we suspect that maybe
conventional constitutional theory is inherently self-defeating, shouldn't we
begin to look at it not from the inside, but from the outside?
II. THE PAST OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A VIEW FROM OUTSIDE
When we first studied constitutional law-sometime around a decade
ago-the conventional theory that I have described was pretty much all we
were given in the way of constitutional theory. And, even at that, it was still at
a relatively nebulous stage of development. Without any apparent alternative
to it, without any very clear sense of its defining contours, we were trapped
54. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 393-615 (1969).
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inside it. Controversies about subsidiary issues like the justification ofjudicial
review, judicial "activism" versus "deference," "neutral principles," "bal-
ancing," and so forth took up our energy. So, perhaps we can be excused for
having failed to distance ourselves and consider critically the more basic
problems of constitutional theory. Now, there is no excuse. Choper and Ely-
particularly Ely-have elucidated and perfected conventional theory, putting
the subsidiary issues into a larger framework. Alternatives to it are starting to
be sketched. Now, if we do not try to look at conventional theory from the
outside, we will have only ourselves to blame for our entrapment in it.
There seem to be two main sorts of external critique which are beginning
to be applied to conventional theory. They suggest different directions for the
constitutional theory of the future. The first, I believe, is fine as far as it goes.
But it does not go far enough. I shall argue, instead, that the second offers us
the best opportunity at last to free ourselves from the dead hand of conven-
tional theory and strike out on our own.
A. "Process" and "Substance"
The first sort of external critique distances itself from the debates going
on within conventional theory by occupying high ground from which it looks
down and discerns in them a distorting, deluded superficiality. From its van-
tage point, the problem with conventional theory is the all-consuming focus
on "process values"--and, in particular, on the quality of the political
process-rather than on more fundamental "substantive values." The burden
of this critique is that constitutional theory should be a theory, as Laurence
Tribe puts it, of "fundamental substantive rights.
5
The critique begins by exploiting and extending an internal critique of
"process-orientation." "Process values" cannot be regarded as primary and,
at the same time, be set off from "substantive values" since, Tribe insists, the
former, if primary, are entwined with the latter. 6 This is so in two respects.
The reason process is "constitutionally valued," Tribe argues, is for "its
intrinsic characteristics"-for example, "as an expression of the equal re-
spect in which we as a society aspire to hold each individual" or of "a right to
individual dignity, or some similarly substantive norm.",57 If it is valued only
"as a means to some independent end," it can hardly be viewed by theorists
as primary. Process itself, therefore, becomes substantive. 8 What is more,
the two kinds of values are entwined, Tribe shows, in application as well.59 To
decide whether the political process malfunctioned in burdening some group,
for instance, we cannot help making some substantive estimate of the group's
interest and of the interests served by burdening it. Thus, Tribe notes, "[a]ny
55. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067
(1980). My discussion of Tribe's views in this section refers only to the views he presents in this one article.
56. Id. at 1067-77.
57. Id. at 1070, 1072.
58. Id. at 1070-72.
59. Id. at 1068-70, 1072-77.
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constitutional distinction between laws burdening homosexuals and laws bur-
dening exhibitionists ... must depend on a substantive theory of which
[group is] exercising fundamental rights and which [is] not." 60
Having argued that if "process values" are to be viewed as primary, they
must be acknowledged as "substantive," the critique goes on to contend that
"substantive values," in fact, deserve to be viewed as being of primary im-
portance in constitutional theory. The focus of "process-orientation," in
other words, is not simply confused. Worse, it is upside down. Constitution-
ally, substance is more fundamental than process. Tribe suggests that this is
so on three grounds. First, the latter may depend on fundamental assumptions
about the former, while the former may not depend on assumptions about the
latter. Second, a narrow concentration on the process by which a decision
was reached may produce toleration of decisions whose effects are what
really most matter and strike us as substantively obnoxious. And, third, there
are certain conceptions of value fundamental to specific constitutional provi-
sions-like "freedom" in the first amendment, "equality" in the fourteenth-
that ought to be fully (including substantively) explored instead of being
shaped automatically and superficially to fit the mold of "process values."
In some respects, this critique is attractive. And some of the directions it
points out for future theory ought to be heeded. Surely, "process-oriented"
conceptions of the proper operation of the political process rest on assump-
tions about substantive value-for example, Ely's norm of "equal concern
and respect" depends on assumptions about the character of equality-yet
such assumptions rarely are studied. Without doubt, the importance of value
assumptions to process conceptions-as well as to an assessment of the ef-
fects of decisionmaking processes and the potential meanings of certain pro-
visions of the Constitution--calls for their exploration in the constitutional
theory of the future.
Nevertheless, the critique does not go far enough. It is not, I believe,
critical enough of conventional theory. Nor does it provide us adequate direc-
tion for the future. First, it relies on and, simultaneously, undermines a dis-
tinction between "process values" and "substantive values" that sometimes
seems just a play on words. It is true, to be sure, that "process-oriented"
theory makes much of the distinction. So, it is worthwhile to undermine it,
showing that process issues are substantive issues. But then to turn around
and contend not only that "substantive values" are entwined in process is-
sues and deserve full exploration, but also that they are more fundamental and
should be the primary focus of constitutional theory is to indulge in unneces-
sarily metaphysical typologies. It is to become obsessed with the same over-
abstract distinction that fascinates "process-orientation." I would think that
the crux of conventional theory is which values are embedded in its assump-
tions, not that those values are viewed as having to do with "process" instead
60. Id. at 1076.
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of "substance." And, by the same token, what we need to know is w'hich
values to explore in future theory.
This is not to say that the critique utterly ignores the question of which
values ought to be treated as basic in constitutional theory. To the contrary,
the champions of "substantive theory" do take a position on this question.
Thus Tribe calls for-and criticizes "process-oriented" theory for lacking-
"a developed theory of fundamental rights." What, then, are such "funda-
mental rights"? They are rights, says Tribe, "secured to persons against the
state." And he insists that other norms cannot be "understood, much less
applied, in the absence of" some attention to those values. 61 For Tribe-and
he appears typical of the champions of this approach in this respect 2'-the
values that ought to be treated as basic in constitutional theory have to do
with the security of persons vis-a-vis government.
There lies the second shortcoming of the approach. Bent on combatting
the "process-oriented" focus on values that have to do with the systemic
quality of political life, it goes too far. It tends to slight the importance of such
values-and exaggerate the significance of personal security values. Instead
of arguing that both be viewed as basic, it tends to eclipse the former with
the latter. This blunts its critique of conventional theory. It can fault that
theory for downplaying values of personal security. But it disables itself from
getting at what, I would think, is the crux of conventional theory: which
values involving the systemic quality of political life are taken seriously within
that theory. Furthermore, it also points future theory in a wrong direction.
How can it be that the constitution of our polity is not basic to constitutional
theory? Perhaps the quality of political life cannot be evaluated without con-
sidering what "fundamental rights" persons ought to have against the state.
But how can we consider questions of "fundamental rights" without evaluat-
ing the quality of the political life which is the context of all rights and which
shapes the state?
This approach, finally, suffers from a third shortcoming. It recognizes, as
Tribe says, that constitutional theory "demands precisely the kinds of contro-
versial substantive choices that the process proponents are so anxious to
leave to the electorate and its representatives. ' 63 It thereby sweeps aside the
anxiety that cripples conventional theory from within. If ever there is to be
progress beyond conventional theory, we have to applaud this move: good
riddance. But the champions of this approach generally fail to support the
move. Tribe assumes that any controversial issues addressed by theory must
61. Id. at 1067. Tribe does refer to some other values having to do with the general quality of political
life-political community" and "democracy"---as significant. Id. at 1071, 1078-79. But he does not integrate
these references into his line of argument that personal security values, rather than the quality of the political
process, are what should count as basic to constitutional theory.
62. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977). I am not suggesting that Tribe and
the others who share this basic view also share other views about constitutional theory.




then be given to courts for resolution, invoking "the care and humility that we
are entitled to expect of judges" to support allocation of controversial choices
to them. This sort of argument-familiar in old-time conventional theory-is
an easy target for the likes of Ely.64 Other champions of the approach try
harder, claiming that controversial substantive choices can be tamed by tying
them to an "evolving consensus." 6 This argument, too, has roots in old-time
conventional theory. And it, too, is an easy target for the likes of Ely.
66
If, in future constitutional theory, we are to recognize and embrace the
necessity for controversial choices of value, freeing ourselves from the self-
defeating anxiety of past theory, we must free ourselves of old rationaliza-
tions that only compound the problem. We must confront directly the as-
sumptions that lead "process-oriented" theorists to shy from controversial
choices in constitutional theory, blandly consigning them to the workings of
the political process-assumptions, that is, about the quality of the political
process itself.
B. The Systemic Quality of Our Political Life
There is another critique-the one I want to promote-that distances
itself from the internal debates of conventional theory not by taking ground
high above them to bombard them with a typology of values, but rather by
engaging them directly so as to cut the ground out from under them. It con-
centrates on which values are taken more or less for granted in such debates
and so dominate conventional theory. And, in particular, it criticizes values
involving the systemic quality of our political life that are the foundation of
that theory. This approach, I believe, not only can yield a more powerful
critique, freeing us from our entrapment in the theory of the past. It can also
point out the direction for a promising constitutional theory of the future.
Like the first sort of external critique, this one begins by exploiting an
internal critique of "process-orientation." It capitalizes on the recognition
that the prescriptive-descriptive conception of the functioning and malfunc-
tioning of the political process promoted by "process-oriented" theory can-
not be shown to be objectively "correct." But it is not satisfied merely to
show that the conception is open to controversy. Instead, it proceeds to
investigate and characterize the particular values structuring that conception.
In the end, it characterizes "process-oriented" theory as a sophisticated
apology for the truncated, systemically biased political life of our liberal wel-
fare state.
For now, I simply intend to sketch very roughly the sort of critique this
involves. I have neither the time nor the space to elaborate it and support it
fully here. That is part of the work that remains for the future. To illustrate at
64. See ELY, supra note I, at 44-48.
65. E.g., Wellington, Comnon Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudica-
tion, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
66. ELY. supra note I, at 63-69.
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least its contours, I shall first criticize the basic tenets of the "process-
oriented" conception of the political process. Then, I shall criticize the cru-
cial structural limitations of that conception. And, finally, I shall indicate the
sense in which "process-oriented" theory, as perfected by Choper and Ely, is
an exercise in apologetics.
1. Tenets
Look carefully, once again, at the two most basic, explicit tenets of
the"process-oriented" conception of our political life as set forth by Choper
and Ely. I shall try to outline them somewhat more completely and precisely
than I have up to now:
(1) In operation, our process of representative democracy normally func-
tions well enough.
(a) Government decisionmakers, being responsible to the people at
periodic elections, are generally responsive to the interests of
majorities.
(b) Majorities are not stable through time or across issues. They are
shifting coalitions formed in a process of basically fair and open
competition among "minority" interests.
(c) Because majorities are shifting, government decisionmakers can-
not afford completely to ignore minority interests on any particu-
lar issue for fear that those interests might be necessary to form a
majority later. Thus, generally, they will take all interests into fair
account with respect to particular decisions.
(d) Individuals and groups generally can be counted on to recognize
and promote their own interests through exercise of their voice
and vote.
(2) This process, though, is subject to occasional, systemic malfunc-
tions.
(a) Acting in their own self-interest, those "in" power may try to
restrict the voice and vote of some of those who are "out" of
power, thereby distorting the process of fair interest competition.
(b) In cases of majority prejudice against certain minorities, the
process of formation of shifting majority coalitions may be dis-
torted. So, government decisionmakers may disregard or under-
value the interests of such minorities.
Two things about these prescriptive-descriptive tenets stand out: our political
process works well enough as it is, and it is given (only) to rather discrete
sorts of malfunction. Now, look at how Choper and Ely justify their adher-
ence to the tenets.
First, in assessing the normal functioning of the process, their standard
for concluding that it works well enough turns out to be surprisingly low. For
instance, Choper acknowledges that a great number of citizens do not vote,
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take no significant part in our political life (i.e., by using their "voice") and
are "almost totally uninformed" on "both major questions of public policy
and minor matters of detail." 67 Yet, according to Choper, that might not "be
as incompatible with majority rule as it is made to sound." He weakly opines
that "a great many" issues "do not concern large numbers of voters and
probably should not."' 6 By the same token, both authors acknowledge that
legislatures very often are not responsive to majority coalitions seeking pas-
sage of new legislation or a repeal of old legislation. Politically effective
minorities, they concede, often undermine representative democracy. But
they insist that so long as such minorities can only block legislation-and not
pass their own legislation without majority support-that is good enough.69
Finally, Choper insists that the majority (of those who vote) can sometimes
affect policies on "fundamental" issues in an election "if they feel strongly
enough about them." 70 Still, as a day-to-day matter-when the mass of citi-
zens do not "feel strongly enough," or are not well informed or simply do not
take any significant part in political activity-Choper concedes that our politi-
cal process works through the "Burkean trusteeship" of our representatives,
informed by the influence of regularly active minority interest groups.7' The
"trusteeship," he notes, is constrained mainly by a fear that the usually
passive, uninformed bulk of citizens might, in extremis, be driven to "'out-
rage"' and, at long last, break form, wake up, and mobilize themselves for the
next election. 72 Nonetheless, he maintains that this system does "comport
with democracy, albeit somewhat murkily and imprecisely.- 73 Despite "sur-
face blemishes," he insists, there is an "unshrinking core of popular responsi-
bility" in our political process. 74
Contained in all of this, quite plainly, is a relatively simple assumption.
The standard by which Choper and Ely determine the normal functioning of
our political process to be good enough is not simply low. It is skewed against
concern for potential majorities-the mass of people who are not now politi-
cally active and whose interests can be most routinely blocked by more ef-
fective interests. At bottom, both authors assume that our process of interest
competition and representation works well enough even when the bulk of
citizens take no very significant, regular part in it.
Turn, secondly, to their identification and discussion of instances in
which the political process malfunctions. The sorts of instances they identify
are, I have mentioned, fairly discrete. That follows from the tenet that in
general the process functions adequately. But the instances of malfunctioning
are not just discrete. They are also skewed. And, again, they are skewed
67. CHOPER. supra note I. at 15.
68. Id. at 31.
69. Id. at 26-27; ELY, supra note I, at 67.
70. CHOPER, supra note I. at 30.
71. Id. at 31.
72. Id. at 33. See ELY. supra note I, at 129.
73. CHOPER, supra note I. at 45.
74. Id. at 48.
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against concern for potential majorities, who take no significant part in the
process of political interest competition. Just as the routine non-participation
of such citizens is not treated as detracting from the adequate functioning of
the political process, so too it is not treated as an indication that the process is
malfunctioning.
Choper and Ely do not see any indication of malfunctioning there be-
cause of another, related but deeper assumption. As they see it, people who
are not minority victims of prejudice and have the opportunity to use their
voice and vote, and yet take no part in our political life, do not have anything
important to complain about from the standpoint of constitutional order. Such
citizens presumably choose their own passivity; they may be satisfied with
governmental decisions on the whole, or they may simply prefer to do other
things with their time.75 Presumably, such citizens can also "trust" govern-
ment decisionmakers to take their interests into account and serve them ade-
quately since perception of their interests is not distorted by majority preju-
dice. 76 These articles of faith of "process-oriented" theory are blind to the
likelihood that the "choice;, of political passivity by inactive citizens and
service of their interests by the government may be significantly undermined
by inequalities of power, wealth, status, and education. The fact is that the
theory depends, at bottom, on the assumption that such inequalities afflicting
the mass of citizens-not members of a "discrete and insular" minority-
need not be taken into consideration for purposes of evaluating the function-
ing and malfunctioning of our system of representative democracy.
To give some idea of the controversialism and bias of this assumption, I
shall note a few concerns that "process-orientation" should consider but does
not. In order to avoid the usual charge that only "radicals" could regard it as
an implausible assumption, I shall rely on the recent books by two "main-
stream" scholars and sometime collaborators: Robert Dahl and Charles
Lindblom.77
First of all, the "choice" by citizens to remain politically quiescent ap-
pears substantially less than "free." Dahl describes it in terms of a "cycle of
defeat" by which "low resources," "weak political incentives," and "inade-
quate skills" reinforce each other.78 "[O]f all the factors that social scientists
have used to account for differences in political participation, differences in
social and economic status are the most important," he reports. 79 While
"skills and incentives are to some extent independent of resources," he notes
that "they do tend to run together in the United States." 8" And he adds:
75. See id. at 30-31.
76. This notion would follow from the belief of both authors that officials tend to "disregard" only the
interests of minority victims of prejudice.
77. Dahl is one of the political scientists that Choper and Ely most like to cite. See CHOPER, supra note I,
at 488; ELY, supra note 1, at 264. And many of Dahl's ideas were developed with Lindblom in R. DAHL & C.
LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE (1953). In order not to take way more than my share of
space, I shall try to stick with citing only Dahl and Lindblom.
78. R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 488 (3d ed. 1976).
79. Id. at 450.
80. Id. at 488.
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What is more, it must come as a shock to many Americans to learn that the effects
on political participation of these differences in social and economic status appear
to be greater in the United States than in other democracies. In one comparison,
only in India were the differences in participation greater!
81
Yet such general barriers to political participation do not figure in the evalua-
tion of our political life by Choper and Ely.
Second, the extent to which the inactive, less well-to-do citizens can
count on government officials to give their interests "equal concern and re-
spect" is open to substantial question. Dahl observes that "[t]hose who are
better off participate more, and by participating more they exercise more
influence on government officials. ' ' n And, as to those with lower resources,
"[d]ecisions ... are likely to be made, therefore, without taking their prefer-
ences into account."-83 Lindblom carries the point farther. He contends
that business has a "privileged position" in our political process. Business
interests, he asserts, are not simply capable of blocking a majority will; they
are also assured of special treatment.84 For Choper and Ely, none of this need
be taken very seriously.
Choper does consider the role of interest groups in politics. He observes
that there "is a sizable literature" on the problem-and cites a book published
in 1951. 85 He says that "our knowledge" on the matter is "far from com-
plete"-and cites a book published in 1963.86 Citing an article also published
in 1963-and a book published in 1928-he dons his rose-colored glasses and
claims:
the several studies undertaken suggest that the various interest groups tend to fill
existing gaps-or serve as effective links-between voters and representatives,
especially between elections; that legislators tend to respond initially by seeking to
determine whether the urgings of pressure groups reflect a generally held constitu-
ent view, are opposed by a majority of their electorates, or involve a matter that is
of no special concern to most of the voters in their district; and that the lawmakers
then exercise that degree of judgment with which they feel empowered-but al-
most always with the next election in mind.s7
He concludes by quoting Alexander Bickel's view-vintage 1962-that
"'no one has claimed"' pressure groups are able to "'capture"' government
without "'combining in some fashion, and thus capturing or constitut-
ing.., a majority.'" 88 Needless to say, such a claim has been made in
the intervening eighteen years-for instance by Lindblom. 89 But Choper
81. Id. at 451.
82. Id. at 449.
83. Id. at 493.
84. Id.
84. C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 170-200 (1977).
85. CHOPER, supra note I. at 23.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 45.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. 1 shall stick with Dahl and Lindblom and resist offering a massive string citation of the literature Choper
slights. But it may be worth noting that even introductory political science texts could be cited. E.g., E.
GREENBERG. THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980); M. PARENTI, DEMOCRACY FOR THE FEW
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appears oblivious to the fact. 9° He does quote Dahl-from a book published in
1956-to the effect that the process of "minorities rule" works within a "con-
sensus set by the important values of the politically active members of the
society." 9' Yet he seems not to know (or perhaps care) about Dahl's more
recent analysis of the effect of inequality on which members of society be-
come "politically active."-
92
Third, if any one of the tenets of the "process-oriented" conception of
our political process is the most fundamental, it is the tenet that citizens are
able to recognize and articulate their own interests. They clearly will not have
the capacity to promote their interests through political participation and
thereby ensure that government officials take their interests into account
unless they have that prior ability. Yet even this tenet is questionable if social
and economic inequalities are considered. Dahl contends that "opportunities
for discovering what one wants [and] for communicating to others what one
wants" are impaired by inequalities in education.9 And, once again, Lind-
blom goes farther. He explores a phenomenon of "circularity" in our political
process. He argues that business interests "mold" the "volitions" of the
mass of citizens at least on "grand issues" of social and economic structure. 94
Ely does comment briefly on this question of "false consciousness." He
recognizes that "sufficiently pervasive prejudice" against some minorities
may distort their perceptions of their self-interests. 95 And, earlier, in dis-
missing "consensus" as a basis for identifying constitutional values, he enter-
tains the view that a "consensus" is "likely to reflect only the domination of
some groups by others."-96 But, when it comes to evaluating the functioning
and malfunctioning of our political process, neither he nor Choper bothers to
examine the likelihood that political interest competition is systemically dis-
torted by a similar domination rooted in general social and economic in-
equalities.
In at least these three respects, then, "process-oriented theory is oblivi-
ous to the effect that inequalities afflicting the bulk of quiescent citizens may
have on the systemic quality of our political life-thus its bias against the
interests of potential majorities. The malfunctions on which this theory
(3d ed. 1980). So could contemporary political science "classics." E.g., H. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF
AMERICAN PLURALISM (1961); T. LOWI, THE END OF UBERALISM (1969); G. MCCONNELL. PRIVATE
POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE
(1960).
90. Perhaps I am being too hard on Choper herg. After all, Ely is just about as oblivious to noncentrist
and/or recent political science writing. But the fact is that Choper, more than Ely, purports to rest his argument
on political science research.
91. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 45.
92. For Dahl's even more recent writing on political inequality, see Dahl, On Removing Certain Impedi-
ments to Democracy in the United States, 92 POL. SCI. Q. 1 (1977); Dahli, Pluralism Revisited, 10 COMP.
POLITICS 191 (1978); Dahl, What is Political Equality?, DISSENT 363 (Summer 1979); Dahl, A Reply to Richard
Krouse, DISSENT 456 (Fall 1980).
93. R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 491 (3d ed. 1976).
94. C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 201-13 (1977).
95. ELY, supra note I, at 165.
96. Id. at 63.
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focuses have to do, rather, with the concerns of "discrete and insular" mi-
norities. Yet, even then, "process-oriented" theorists resist recognition of
social and economic inequalities. Their resistance invites a last insight into the
assumptions underlying the tenets of the theory.
Choper and Ely identify "discrete and insular" minorities-and thus
political malfunctioning-strictly by searching for the existence of preju-
dice. They both believe that prejudice distorts the "empathy" that decision-
makers otherwise may feel for citizens. 97 But, if it is clear that prejudice is
crucial in "process-oriented" theory, it has never been clear exactly what is
supposed to be the root of prejudice, the malady that the theory, at bottom, is
meant to address. Consequently, it has never been clear exactly what is
supposed to be the cure for prejudice. Ely investigates the issue. He recog-
nizes that merely affording a minority group access to the political process
cannot, by itself, cure prejudice; so, he argues, the process may malfunction
even if it is open to all minorities. 98 But, he says, there is a cure. The cure is
"'social intercourse. "99 And, he implies, the malady is a lack of such "social
intercourse." If all minorities enjoyed both access to the political process and
"social intercourse" with the rest of us, there would be no reason to be
concerned any longer about any malfunctioning of the process. For, says Ely,
"[tihe more we get to know people who are different in some ways, the more
we will begin to appreciate the ways in which they are not, which is the
beginning of political cooperation.'"o
Now, there is something peculiar about this. I would think that "social
intercourse" is unlikely to cure prejudice so long as the parties concerned are
substantially unequal in power or status. It is said, after all, that slave owners
enjoyed close and regular association with their slaves. If Ely complains that
that was not the right kind of "social intercourse," we are entitled to ask him:
why not? Not long ago, it was said that if only whites and blacks were
integrated, racial prejudice would disappear. Now, that view seems naive. If
Ely objects that, so far, integration has not produced the right kind of "social
intercourse," we ought to ask: how so? If inequalities of power and status
have something to do with it, why obfuscate them with vague talk of "social
intercourse"?
It is possible, at this point, that Ely will concede that inequalities have a
lot to do with it.'0 ' But the concession would discredit the theory. It would
grant that prejudice is not really the most fundamental barrier to full partici-
pation in our politics by minority groups. It would grant that most minority
groups are, roughly, in a position similar to that of the mass of nonminority
97. Id. at 160-61; CHOPER, supra note I, at 65.
98. ELY. supra note 1, at 151.
99. Id. at 161.
100. Id. The banal, sentimental character of this statement of Ely's central assumption contrasts curiously
with the sharp, witty verbal pyrotechnics that run through less central portions of his argument.
101. See id. at 135. See also text accompanying notes 109-10 infra.
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citizens afflicted by inequalities-and hence that the theory is, at bottom,
almost as oblivious to the plight of one as the other.
In other words, such a concession would entitle us to ask: If inequalities
have a good deal to do with the malfunctioning of the political process vis-a-
vis most "discrete and insular" minorities, is it not probable that inequalities
afflicting other citizens also spoil the quality of our political life-and of our
constitutional order? At that point, if I know "process-oriented" theory, Ely
is unlikely to make any more concessions.
2. Structure
What should we make of this sort of blindness and bias in "process-
oriented" theory? As a first step toward an answer, we ought to look at
certain limitations built into the structure of the theory. There are, I believe,
several important structural limitations. Plainly, they are related. Plainly,
some are more fundamental than others. But, taken together, they may begin
to help us interpret-though not explain-the theory's stubborn resistance to
a broader, deeper, more critical evaluation of the political process.
The first and probably the most obvious structural factor that limits the
vision of "process-oriented" theory involves its special obsession: "the prob-
lem" of judicial review. Since both Choper and Ely are likely to defend the
role of this limitation, I shall discuss it at some length. In the end, however, I
shall argue that it is a good deal less significant than the others.
"Process-oriented" theory focuses first and foremost on the quality of
the political process. It aims at stating requisites of constitutional order for
that process. And so it works out a conception of the functioning and malfunc-
tioning of our politics. Yet it also aims to do something else. It assumes that
the only requisites worthy of much discussion are ones that can and ought to
be enforced. "2 Therefore, it focuses on the judicial process as well. It seeks to
justify, and state norms for, the exercise of judicial review. To do so, it must
work from a conception of the functioning and malfunctioning of the judicial
process. The theory aspires, finally, to mesh this conception of the judicial
process with its conception of the political process.
The basic principle it adopts to mesh the conceptions is that the judicial
process malfunctions if it intervenes when the political process is functioning
well enough, but that, at least prima facie, it functions properly so long as it
intervenes only when the political process is malfunctioning' 0 3 So stated, this
"meshing" principle manifestly subordinates the conception of the judicial
process to the conception of the political process. The latter marks the
boundaries of the former. In practice, however, the former sometimes seems
to mark the boundaries of the latter.
102. The assumption may be rooted in the influence of the picture of disembodied constitutional order. See
text accompanying note 8 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 18-31 supra.
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What characteristically happens is this. The conception of the judicial
process, first of all, seems to evolve a life of its own. Assuming, as a general
matter, that judicial review is a "counter-majoritarian" anomaly in our de-
mocracy, theorists see it as fundamentally problematic. They fear that, in
general, it creates serious risks of judges imposing their values on us all.'04
And these concerns are not entirely put to rest by the principle limiting ju-
dicial intervention to instances of malfunctioning in the political process.
Instead, the general, worried conception of the judicial process is embedded
deep in the structure of the theory and is taken for granted when theorists turn
to determine what should count as a malfunctioning of our political process.
Thus, when "process-oriented" theorists focus on the political process,
they do so through the darkened, constricted lens of their worries about the
judicial process. Whatever political malfunctioning they identify calls, by
their assumption, for the' exercise of judicial review. The identification of any
instance of malfunctioning, then, becomes fundamentally problematic. The
effect is to build into the structure of the theory a limitation on its capacity to
point out and criticize malfunctioning in our political process-a bias toward
proclaiming the process to be basically fair and sound.
There is evidence of this structural limitation at work in the books by
Choper and Ely. Its influence shows most plainly early in both books when
the authors insist that, even though our political process is "imperfectly"
democratic, it generally works democratically enough from the standpoint of
constitutional order. To conclude otherwise, they note, would invite whole-
sale judicial review. And no matter how undemocratic the political process
may be, it is more democratic, they contend, than judicial review. 05
Yet, surely, this goes too far. By this standard, judicial review of any
actions by any elected officials (or appointees who are responsible to them)
would seem inappropriate. This standard, then, would seem to indicate that in
order to avoid the need for judicial review, we should treat the political
process as working well enough not generally, but always. Neither Choper
nor Ely is willing to adopt such a position. By their lights, the political
process, though based on elections, does seriously malfunction-and judicial
review, however undemocratic even by comparison with a malfunctioning
political process, is justified-sometimes.
The question is: when? One factor that occasionally seems to structure
their response to this question is the general worry about judicial review.
First, it influences them to minimize the instances of malfunctioning they
identify. Thus, Choper backs his view that the political process should be
treated as working well enough on matters of national power vis-a-vis the
states-hence, that the Court should stay out of the area-by arguing, in part,
that the Court needs to ration its precious "capital" and "reduce the discord
104. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1%2).
105. CHOPER, supra note I, at 48; ELY, supra note I, at 67.
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between judicial review and majoritarian democracy."' 6 Second, the worry
about judicial review also produces norms (like the norm of "principled"
decisionmaking) intended to restrain the judiciary. The authors are moved, in
turn, to identify only such instances of political malfunctioning as can be
corrected without violating the norms. Thus, Ely backs his view that most
instances of "false consciousness" should not be treated as involving a mal-
functioning of the political process by arguing, in part, that an evaluation of
"false consciousness" depends on mere disagreements with substantive
choices, something courts must avoid.'07
It might be tempting for defenders of "process-oriented" theory to claim
that their worry about the undemocratic character of judicial review is the
most important-indeed, even the only important-structural factor that
limits their criticism of the political process. They might say: "Personally, we
would like to correct a lot more 'imperfections' in our democracy. As a matter
of constitutional theory, however, we cannot take on all of those things. The
reason has nothing to do with any of our assumptions about the quality of our
political life. Instead, it has only to do with the fact that judicial review is
utterly undemocratic and, hence, that it must be used sparingly and in a
restrained fashion." This claim will not wash.
It will not wash for two reasons. First, as perfected by Choper and Ely,
the theory does not ground its benign assessment of the quality of the political
process only-or even primarily--on arguments involving the limitations of
judicial review. An important advance made by both authors is, after all, to
come out from hiding behind the subsidiary question of judicial review and rely
on a direct conception (in terms of interest competition and interest repre-
sentation) of the functioning and malfunctioning of our political process.
Surely, concern about judicial review has a limiting influence. But limitations
that are intrinsic to that conception must be at work as well. It could hardly be
otherwise. For, second, the concern about judicial review is itself bound up
with basic assumptions about the quality of the political process. Once
"process-oriented" theorists determine that certain sorts of political mal-
functioning are sufficiently serious to call for the exercise of judicial review,
despite its "undemocratic" character, then the concern that remains becomes
relative. It varies-and the efforts to minimize and restrain judicial review
vary-with assumptions about the quality of the political process. The more
fundamentally sound the theorists assume the process to be-the more ex-
ceptional they assume serious malfunctioning to be-then the more anomal-
ous judicial review will appear to them. The more anomalous it appears, the
more they will seek to minimize and restrain it. And the more they seek to do
that, the greater will be their inclination to identify only limited instances of
political malfunctioning, thus depicting the political process as basically
sound. But now we have come full circle. An assumption of basic soundness
106. CHOPER, supra note I, at 2.
107. ELY, supra note I, at 166-67.
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yields a relatively sharp concern about judicial review that then yields a
depiction of basic soundness. Consequently, it is in the "process-oriented"
conception of our politics-and not so much in concerns about judicial
review-that we ought to look for the most crucial structural limitations on the
vision of "process-oriented" theory.
There are five related factors that structure and limit this conception of
the quality of our political life. They have to do with the sorts of values to be
guaranteed, and the power to be regulated, by constitutional order. Their
effect, as a whole, is not just to limit the capacity of "process-oriented"
theory to identify malfunctioning in the political process. More precisely, it is
to blind the theory to a particular type of malfunctioning: the routine political
ineffectiveness and quiescence-rooted in social and economic inequality-of
masses of ordinary citizens.
The first limitation of the "process-oriented" conception of political life
is, of course, its primary focus on the process by which outcomes are gen-
erated, not on the outcomes themselves. In particular, "process-oriented"
theory maintains that, from the point of view of constitutionality, distributive
outcomes are not of primary importance. Thus Ely opines that constitutional
order does not depend on "some 'appropriate' distributional pattern." 0 8
This structural limitation-diverting attention from the distribution of
resources that comes out of the political process-may have an effect of
diverting attention from inequalities in the distribution of resources that in-
fluence what comes into the process as well. But the effect is only tentative.
Ely, in fact, suggests that inattention to distributive outcomes does not imply
inattention to unequal inputs. He notes parenthetically that the "distribu-
tional pattern" resulting from the political process may even be worth study-
ing as "powerful evidence of what that process is likely to have been."'09
And, in one brief passage, he goes so far as to note that recently "more stress
has been placed on the undeniable concentrations of power, and inequalities
among the various competing groups, in American politics."" 0 In that pas-
sage, he almost seems to promise that his theory will grapple with the impacts
of general inequalities and concentrations of power on the political process.
He does not, however, deliver on the promise. To begin to interpret his
failure, we have to look at the other structural elements of his theory.
The second limitation built into the "process-oriented" conception of our
political life is its primary focus on only one dimension-the simplest and
most restricted dimension-of the phenomenon of power: decisionmaking.
The power which absorbs its attention is power evidenced in particular deci-
sions-decisions, for example, to benefit or burden particular groups or ac-
tivities. To put the point even more simply, the power that counts is power
whose evidence is visible in concrete actions, concrete behavior.
108. Id. at 135
109. Id. at 136.
110. Id. at 135.
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The behaviorist character of this conception of politics limits its capacity
to perceive a broader, deeper, more difficult dimension of power. Focusing on
power evidenced in decisions, it tends not to see power as a relationship
among groups-a relationship, that is, in which certain groups simply "have"
more power than other groups by virtue of having more resources of one sort
or another.' In the eyes of "process-oriented" theory, the condition of
"being" weak is not significant in itself. Thus the theory ignores the proba-
bility that a condition of weakness might prevent a group from appreciating,
articulating, and mobilizing to promote its interests. It thereby ignores the
probability that a condition of weakness might impair a group's capacity even
to get its interests on the "agenda" of the political process. In other words,
the "process-oriented" conception of politics is oblivious to a dimension of
power involving "nondecisions," that is, inaction."
2
Even in assessing decisionmaking, a third structural factor restricts its
vision. As perfected by Choper and Ely, the theory concentrates on only two
dimensions of the decisionmaking process: whether "access" was open and
whether decisions were motivated by "prejudice." The focus on access and
prejudice diverts attention, once again, from the fact of unequal participation
in the process. Access, of course, is important. But "process-orientation"
fails to assess what actually was done with access. It is blind to the dimension
of the process "located" in between access and decision: the competition
among-and the capacity of-groups to exploit their access and influence the
decision. By neglecting to attend to this dimension, "process-orientation"
fails to take account of the effectiveness with which groups having unequal
resources take part in the competition. Undoubtedly, its focus on motivation
of decisions by prejudice can get at some distortions of the process of compe-
tition indirectly. But since it gets only at distortions afflicting minority victims
of prejudice-and since, even as to them, it provides a check only against
manifest oppression, not a guarantee of effective participation-it further
obfuscates the competitive disadvantages of masses of ordinary citizens.
The fourth limitation built into the "process-oriented" conception of
politics is probably the one most taken for granted. The decisionmaking
process the theory addresses represents simply one dimension of decision-
making processes-the one located in the government. Hence, the sort of
power with which the theory deals represents only one dimension of power:
official power. Although political theorists long have known that the (small
44c") constitution of a polity resides not only in the distribution and use of
official power, but also in the distribution and use of "private" power, " 3
"process-oriented" theory concentrates on the former and, for the most part,
ignores the latter.
I11. See S. LUKES, POWER (1974).
112. See P. BACHRACH & M. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY 39-51 (1970); S. LUKES, POWER 11-25,
36-45 (1974).
113. Dahl mentions Jefferson, Madison, Aristotle, and Rousseau. R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY INTHE UNITED
STATES 491 (3d ed. 1976).
[Vol. 42:223
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
It is true, of course, that Choper and Ely assign great importance to
prejudice against minorities, and prejudice has its origin in society, not in
government. It is true, also, that Ely stresses the importance of "social inter-
course" as the solvent of prejudice. But, in the end, prejudice is important to
them only insofar as it seems to infect decisions by government. They do not
even bother to mention what would appear one of the most critical doctrines
of constitutional law: the state action doctrine. For "process-oriented"
theory is, at bottom, blind to the distribution and exercise of social power
outside government. It thereby blinds itself to conditions which frustrate
"social intercourse," inequalities which disable masses of citizens from effec-
tive participation in the official political process, and myriad circumstances in
which individuals, day by day, are subject to-and are trained to subject
themselves to-the will of others.
The last structural limitation of the "process-oriented" conception of
political life follows from the others and helps to put them into sharp relief. It
involves the nature of the rights guaranteed by constitutional order. On this
subject, Ely pursues the implications of "process-orientation" farther than
any of his predecessors. He characterizes most constitutional guarantees as
guarantees of a fair process. Then, he concentrates on two kinds of guaran-
tees: rights of access to the political process ("voice" and "vote") and rights
of minorities to fair treatment within the process." 4 As to the former, he
acknowledges an irreducible core of "substantive constitutional entitle-
ment."" 5 But, outside that minimum core, he proposes one principle to in-
form and govern both kinds of guarantees: the principle that government must
treat all interests with "equal concern and respect." This principle means that
whether interests are to be protected will depend on whether the reason for a
decision burdening them was neutral in regard to those interests. "6 Thus
"process-orientation" homogenizes a huge portion of constitutional rights
and grants us a general right to a neutral reason when government fails to
serve our interests.
This homogenization of rights yields definitive answers to a range of
issues. Just as an equal protection claim of a minority group will fail if the
government has a reason for burdening that group independent of prejudice
against it, so many free speech claims (for example, of a right to burn a draft
card as a protest) will fail if the government has a reason for burdening the
speech independent of its content.'" 7 The homogenized right to a neutral
reason also justifies quick dismissal of most claims having to do with the
incapacities of the poor. For as Ely notes:
114. ELY. supra note I. at 88-101, 105-25.
115. Id. at 145.
116. Id. at 141. The "equal concern and respect" principle was originally Ronald Dworkin's. See R.
DWORKIN. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977). For present purposes, I am concerned only with the
meaning Ely-not Dworkin-gives to the principle. It is of some interest, though, that Ely, who mocks reliance
on the philosophy of John Rawls to identify constitutional values, himself partially relies on the philosophy of
Ronald Dworkin (and Robert Nozick). Compare ELY, supra note I, at 58 with id. at 82, 136.
117. ELY, supra note I. at 136-45.
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[F]ailures to provide the poor with one or another good or service, insensitive as
they may often seem to some of us, do not generally result from a sadistic desire to
keep the miserable in their state of misery, or a stereotypical generalization about
their characteristics, but rather from a reluctance to raise the taxes needed to
support such expenditures-and at all events they will be susceptible to immediate
translation into such constitutionally innocent terms. 118
Yet, as should be plain, this homogenization of rights involves a thinning out
of rights as well.
The effect of the "process-oriented" notion of rights is, first of all, to
divert attention from the substantive weight of the burdens imposed by gov-
ernment. Second, it is to obscure the differential impact of neutrally rational-
ized governmental actions on different groups. Third, it is to slight the interest
in effective enjoyment of rights-such as free speech rights-by groups lack-
ing the resources to make much use of them."9 And, fourth, it is to short-
circuit claims to "affirmative" assistance needed for both the effective and
the equal enjoyment of rights.
As Ely might say, a neutral reason from the government may be "a thing
of beauty and a joy forever" ;2 0 but for those who do not, and cannot, take an
effective and equal part in using the power to which they are subject, in
choosing when and why it will be used, a neutral reason would seem thin stuff
indeed.
3. Apologetics
Now, we are in a position to figure out what to make of "process-
oriented" constitutional theory. The blindness and bias of the theory cannot
be dismissed-any more than Choper can dismiss "imperfections" of our
political process-as mere "surface blemishes." For they are embedded into
its structure. Nor can they be written off as limitations dictated by the con-
stitutional document. For, as Ely shows, its open-ended provisions invite
interpretation in light of some prescriptive-descriptive conception of our
polity; and, as his critics can easily show, no particular conception is plainly
the "correct" one. Nor, finally, can the limitations of the theory be explained
away simply as corollaries of constraints on "the judicial role." For our con-
ception of the judicial role is, instead, the corollary of our conception of our
polity. One conclusion, then, cannot be avoided: the theory is the manifesto
118. Id. at 162.
119. At one point, Ely does take some account of the effective enjoyment of rights, saying that the fact that
sound trucks "are more frequently resorted to by those whose access to more expensive and less annoying
media is limited ... is something that belongs in the calculation." Id. at 11. This little concession is not
elaborated; if Ely were really to take the effective enjoyment of rights seriously, he would, I believe, find the
structure of his theory collapsing in "distributional" inquiries. See text accompanying note 101 supra. In
suggesting that Ely's theory can accommodate serious attention to any distributional issues, Tushnet is mis-
taken. See Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Elk to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1054-55 (1980). My contention is that blindness and bias are structurally basic to the
theory.
120. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973).
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of one political faith. Whether we accept it turns, in the end, on whether we
are adherents of that political faith.
What political faith? As perfected by Choper and Ely, the theory em-
bodies the ideology of what, for some time, has amounted to the center in
American politics. And so it enjoys the typical protective coloring of most
centrist beliefs. It hardly seems to embody a political faith at all. Instead,
urging the integration of minorities into the political process, it appears to
represent nothing more and nothing less than "sound judgment and good
sense." When closely examined, however, it turns out, also, to be an exercise
in apologetics. Proceeding from the conventional assumption that our polity
may sometimes malfunction, but is otherwise basically sound, it obscures our
biased, withered politics in a fog of apologetic rhetoric. It consecrates the
domination of our polity by the politically effective few and the reduction of
the rest to more or less passive consumers of the ministrations of government.
The theory represents, at bottom, the fundamental political faith of the ad-
ministrators of our enlightened, liberal welfare state.'
2
'
The language of "process-oriented" theory is primarily a language of
democracy-which is to say, a language of political equality, political freedom,
and popular sovereignty. This is the language Choper and Ely use to urge
marginal, although undeniably important, reforms of our political process.
Yet this too is the language with which they praise the process. In their hands,
the rhetoric of democracy serves to shield the political process from being
held very rigorously to account to the ideals of democracy.
Consider, first, the "process-oriented" definition of the central problem
of constitutional law: majority rule. And notice that, as "process-oriented"
theorists see it, the central problem is not it'hether a majority of citizens
(actually) rules, but that a majority of citizens (supposedly) rules. Thus, the
primary worry of such theorists-the concern around which their theory
pivots-is that "majorities" may disregard or undervalue the interests of
"minorities." If they even acknowledge the opposite concern-that powerful
minorities can get the state to act in ways that disregard or undervalue in-
terests of nonmobilized majorities and that, in any event, legislative majori-
ties often fail to champion the interests of passive popular majorities-they
tend abruptly to dismiss it. They do not dignify it with serious consideration.
Choper offers brief, bland assurances that majorities do, in fact, "rule."' 122
Ely puts down the opposite view with a flippant crack.'2 To them, majority
rule is not a democratic ideal against which to measure our polity. Rather, it is
something to be taken as given. It is the stuff of a rhetoric, suffusing their
121. See M. WALZER. Dissatisfaction in the Welfare State, in RADICAL PRINCIPLES 23-53 (1980). Choper
and Ely. however, do not go to the extremes of contemporary "neo-conservatism." See, e.g.. Huntington, The
Democratic Distemper, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 9 (Fall 1975). Ely, of course, denies that he is promoting any
ideology. But he does so by assuming a narrow, muddled definition of ideology. asserting that a conception of a
"process of government" is independent of any "governing ideology." ELY, supra note I, at 101.
122. CHOPER, supra note I. at 44-45.
123. ELY, supra note I, at 130 n. *.
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theory, with which they consecrate our polity as already fundamentally ma-
joritarian.
Consider, next, the language they employ to depict the process by which
majorities (supposedly) are formed. Choper and Ely agree that, with its politi-
cal "channels" kept "'unclogged" or "cleared," with the right to "voice and
vote" fully guaranteed, the process is a "democratic" one.'24 They both
invoke the language of political equality to portray that process. Choper
equates protection of "voice and vote" with "affording all participants in the
democratic process a full and fair opportunity to influence the promulgation
and alteration of policies affecting them."25 And Ely describes such protec-
tion as insurance that the process is "open to those of all viewpoints on
something approaching an equal basis." 26 As I have already shown, how-
ever, both of them are blind to the real world of political inequality. They may
well be aware that, in the view of many political scientists, it confuses the
concept of "democracy" to apply it to a polity in which the resources crucial
for effective participation are so unequally distributed. 27 But neither of them
deems it necessary to so much as mention that view. For them, the reality of
political inequality and the conditions for effective participation are not of
much importance-because, for them, the talk about political equality and
"democracy" serves an essentially rhetorical purpose, not to critique the
political process but to depict it as in need only of marginal reform.
Consider, finally, the main sort of reform they urge and the way they
advocate it. Here, I must focus on Ely since Choper only adumbrates his
view. 28 Ely's most important contribution is not his discussion of rights to
"voice and vote"-the rights of citizens as active participants in government.
Instead, his main contribution-and, it would seem, his predominant inter-
est'29-involves rights of citizens as consumers of government. He notes that
minority victims of prejudice often may be unable to "protect" their own
interests, much less affirmatively promote them, through active participation
in the political process. Hence, he proposes a conception of representative
government by which officials would be obliged at least to "take into ac-
count" the interests of those who are unable to "protect themselves." 30 His
proposal envisions an ideally rational welfare state, responsive to the groups
124. Of course, they insist on more than just "open channels"; but the mere "openness" of the channels
counts for them as "'democracy."
125. CHOPER, supra note I, at 71 (emphasis added).
126. ELY, supra note I, at 74 (emphasis added).
127. For purposes of analytic clarity, Dahl has long referred to our polity as a "polyarchy," not a "democ-
racy." He writes: "Certainly the gap between democracy and polyarchy in the United States cannot be
narrowed very much without reducing the amount of inequality among Americans in their access to political
resources." R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 489 (3d ed. 1976). See R. DAHL, POLYARCHY
(1971). See also C. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1977); C. PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970).
128. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 70-79.
129. Ely's chapter on "Clearing the Channels of Political Change" is considerably less intricate and
integrated than his chapter on "Facilitating the Representation of Minorities."
130. ELY, supra note 1, at 82-84.
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which effectively promote their interests in the political process, but guarding
the others against oppression, assessing their interests with a clear-eyed view
of "reality" not "distorted" by prejudice.' 3' The proposal, as far as it goes,
is admirable enough. But Ely is determined to clothe its protection of groups,
whose situation as politically ineffective consumers of government he takes as
given, in the rhetoric of an ideal democracy. Thus, again, he employs the
language of democracy not to insist on the realization of democracy, but as an
apology for acceptance of something much less.
First, he warps the democratic ideals of "participation" and "representa-
tion"-which usually connote a polity founded on an active, effective citi-
zenry-to dress up his conception of a polity in which citizens doomed to
political ineffectiveness rely on officials to take their interests "into account."
He portrays official attention to the concerns of the "functionally powerless"
in the notorious old language-"anathema to our forefathers"--of "virtual
representation." 32 Like the colonial authorities, he twists the ideal of "repre-
sentation" to imply that it is possible to be represented in government without
being able effectively to participate in government. Then, he twists the ideal of
"participation" as well, suggesting that if officials "take into account" the
interests of the powerless in allocating burdens and benefits, the powerless
may then be said to "participate" in "the bounty of government." '33 To tout
"participation" in governmental "bounty," divorced from effective participa-
tion in government itself, is to use a word that implies action to sanctify mere
consumption.
Second, Ely invokes the rhetoric of political equality to insist that when
officials take account of the interests of those unable to "protect them-
selves," they must show "equal concern and respect" for such interests. This
language has a democratic ring. But, as Ely applies it, it denotes the most
minimal "equality" of protection. It simply means that when government
responds to the requests of politically effective groups to serve their interests,
it must have a rationale that does not denigrate the interests of the politically
ineffective groups. 34 It is not clear what, if anything, "equal" then adds to the
requirement of "concern and respect." But it is certain that the requirement
does not afford, as Ely suggests, 3 equality of representation. It allows of-
ficials affirmatively to promote the interests of more powerful citizens while,
at best, it obliges them to protect the interests of "functionally powerless"
citizens. Incantation of egalitarian language may obscure this fact but will not
change it.
Third, Ely manipulates the republican political theory of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries to provide his conception of representative govern-
131. Id. at 153.
132. Id. at 82-84. His emphasis on trust"--like Choper's emphasis on representatives as "'trustees"-
also sugar-coats political passivity.
133. Id. at 74.
134. See text accompanying notes 114-20 supra.
135. ELY. supra note I. at 82.
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ment-responsive to powerful groups but taking account of the interests of
politically ineffective groups-an imprimatur of history. He defines the
central principle of the theory as government "in the interest of the whole
people." 136 He notes that the theory was based on a notion of "the people" as
"an essentially homogenous group," and he even acknowledges that republi-
cans insisted that their polity be based on a more or less equal redistribution
of wealth. 137 But, then, zipping through the nineteenth century, he states that
"faith in the republican tenet that the people.., were essentially homogene-
ous was all but dead." In light of this perceived heterogeneity, he says, "the
theory of representation had to be extended" to ensure that representatives
would respond not only to the "majority" but also take account of the inter-
ests of "minorities.' ' 138 Thus, from the central principle of republicanism, he
derives his own conception. This historical account (for all its superficiality; it
takes only a few pages in his book) is compelling rhetorically. But it obfus-
cates at least two important things. First, Ely swiftly sweeps under the carpet
the republican belief that the polity should rest on a relatively equal distribu-
tion of wealth. He equates it with faith in social homogeneity-hardly a
necessary equation-and then hastens to observe-as though it dealt with the
problem-that that faith was "dead" by the nineteenth century. He moves
the shells pretty fast. But, examined closely, the derivation of his conception
of representative government from republican theory is too obviously flawed
to have much value as anything more than rhetoric. Second, the derivation is
also flawed in its premise. In stating what he treats as the central principle of
republicanism-government in the interest of the whole people-Ely flatly
ignores an equally vital republican principle: that the polity rests upon the
virtue of, and the vigilant attention to public affairs by, the people.' 39 In
republican theory, citizenship is taken seriously. It is seen as necessarily
active. In fact, maintenance of government in the interest of the people is said
to depend on active involvement of the people in political life. 40 Ely, how-
ever, not only suppresses the republican concern for social equality, he sup-
presses as well this republican tenet of an active citizenry. He thereby enables
himself to use republicanism to cloak his radically different conception of
representative government, which takes inequality and the passivity of the bulk
of citizens for granted.
The political faith embodied in "process-oriented" theory, as perfected
by Choper and Ely, is in many respects laudable. In calling for the integration of
minority groups into a polity that is assumed to be otherwise basically sound, it
is resonant of the most advanced liberal thought of the late 1950s, the period
136. Id. at 79.
137. Id. (misspelling of "'homogeneous" in original).
138. Id. at 82.
139. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 52-70 (1969).




when Choper and Ely grew up.141 Much of its program was achieved-in part
by the Warren Court-during the 1960s.142 Now, it is mostly a matter of
defending those achievements. And in the next decade they will need defend-
ing. To the extent that the books by Choper and Ely build needed defenses,
they deserve our applause.
Nevertheless, they do not deserve our emulation. In his criticism of an-
other constitutional theory, Ely complains that it is marred by a "systematic
bias ... in favor of the values of the upper-middle, professional class from
which most lawyers and judges... are drawn.' ' 43 So is his "process-
oriented" theory. It seeks the integration of minorities into a polity that is
biased against citizens who lack the resources needed to be politically ef-
fective, a polity therefore in which masses of citizens sink into political pas-
sivity as clients dependent on the minimal protection provided by the welfare
state, a polity which consequently is dominated by the "upper-middle profes-
sional class." "Process-oriented" theory is not just uncritical of that polity. It
constitutes an apology for it.
III. THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WITHOUT MAPS
"People understandably think that what is important to them is impor-
tant, and people like us are no exception," proclaims Ely.' 44 Nor are people
like us. Like our elders, who elaborated and have now perfected "process-
oriented" constitutional theory, we are in the "upper-middle professional
class." That-along with myriad other things, including caution-may incline
us simply to pursue the line of inquiry laid out by our predecessors, adding
filigree to their conceptions of the functioning and malfunctioning of the
political process, perhaps extending their proposals for marginal reform, but
embracing, as they have embraced, and apologizing, as they have apologized,
for the status quo, further obfuscating its deep injustice. But that need not be
our fate. We grew up in an era when it was virtually impossible to feel
comfortable with the status quo, an era when it was not so easy to dismiss a
"radical" critique with a clubbish word of derision, an era when hope for a
newer world came naturally. It is open to us, as it was not open, to our
predecessors, to imagine a political life far different-far more democratic-
than the one we know now. It is given to us to re-explore the constitutional
theory of our polity.
141. 1 do not mean to make any sort of claim of generational-determinism either with respect to their
generation or mine. But it would seem obvious that the time when one grows up is influential on one's thought
and attitudes. See the general discussion of the "theory of generations'" in R. WOHL, THE GENERATION OF
1914 (1979).
142. Ely suggests that the work of the Warren Court was consistent with his approach. ELY, supra note 1,
at 75. In a later article, I intend to explore the extent to which the Warren Court also began to develop a concern
with the "equal and effective enjoyment" of rights inconsistent with Ely's approach.
143. Id. at 59.
144. Id.
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If we strike out in that direction, however, we shall have to do so without
clear maps. Scholarship in other fields will be helpful. But, for the most part,
past constitutional law scholarship will not. Once we recognize the blindness
and bias that is built into its structure, we shall see that we are largely on our
own. Only a few very general aspects of the job ahead of us seem plainly
marked.
First, we need to deepen our critique of orthodox theory. This is impor-
tant, on one hand, in order to ensure that we-and our students--do not, in
the inevitable moments of uncertainty, slip back into the easy argot of the
past. On the other hand, it is also important in order to derive lessons for the
future. Any critique ought to involve an articulation of the assumptions that
go unstated in conventional theory. It also ought to involve analysis of how
such assumptions are concealed in the theory and how they work to promote
its (apparently) persuasive force. Finally, it ought to involve an exposure of
the nonnecessity and even the perniciousness of those assumptions.45 No
doubt, we will be told that we have no standing to criticize the orthodoxy until
we have something well-developed to offer in its place. We should resist that
admonition. For if we do not develop our critique, we shall never free our-
selves of the terms of conventional theory to develop anything new.
Second, even to begin to remake constitutional theory, we need to liber-
ate our enterprise from the deep constraints imposed by the implicit mission
of conventional theory. That is, we must set aside the polar pictures of em-
bodied and disembodied constitutional order and repudiate the goal of recon-
ciling them. Once we free ourselves of the picture of embodied order, we shall
need no longer to take it for granted that the constitution of our polity is
fundamentally sound, subject only to occasional malfunctioning. Thus, we
shall free constitutional theory of its basically conservative, apologetic orien-
tation and allow it to take into account much more radical flaws in our political
process. By casting off the picture of disembodied order, we shall unburden
theory of its futile, constraining aspiration to political neutrality. And, so, we
shall invest it with a capacity not only to take into account, but also to critique
the radical flaws in our political life.
The final aspect of the job ahead of us in constructing a new constitutional
theory is the most important but, for now, the most opaque. It involves
elaboration of a new-a much more ambitious--conception of what our
polity could and should be, a critique of our actual polity in the terms of that
conception and then an analysis of its possible implications for the substantive
values to be vindicated, and doctrines through which to vindicate them, in
various areas of constitutional law.'46 We shall have to be willing to speculate
145. My approach in my "political vision" project is to focus on assumptions secreted in the rhetoric and
imagery of conventional constitutional law argument.
146. My approach is to take seriously and work from (while, no doubt, revising) the classical conception of
a republic, including its elements of relative equality, mobilization of the citizenry, and civic virtue.
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freely about these matters without making the conventional assumption that
anything we advocate necessarily must be capable of immediate enforcement
by the courts. Judicial enforcement and its timing may depend, after all, on all
sorts of prudential concerns; 147 and unless we segregate those concerns and
insist on their clearly subsidiary status, we shall allow-just as our predeces-
sors have allowed--our perception of the present condition of our polity and
of what can immediately be accomplished within it to stunt our vision of what
our polity might, one day, become and our criticism of what it now is.
148
There is no predicting now what the constitutional theory of the future
will be. But, at least, it is ours-for the time being-to make. And it is our
mission, I am convinced, to make it something very different-an expression
of the possibilities of democracy instead of an apology for its corruption-
from the constitutional theory of the past.
147. The best discussion of this aspect of the enforcement of constitutional law is still A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-272 (1962). Bickel's discussion, however, is spoiled by his inadequate
conception of the political process, see text accompanying notes 39 and 45 supra, and by his deeply conserva-
tive assumptions about the limits of prudent reform, which came to the surface in his later writing. See A.
BICKEL. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT (1975); Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV.
769 (1971).
148. Although I regard the study of prudent constraints on (and opportunities for) reform as-for the
moment-subsidiary, I nonetheless view it as important and, in the long run, essential. Eventually, we need a
conception of what openings for what sorts of reform our polity contains at what times. We need also a
conception of how constitutional law and argument might take advantage of such openings and help create new
ones.
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